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HOW CONGRESS PAVED THE WAY FOR 
THE REHNQUIST COURT'S FEDERALISM 
REVIVAL: LESSONS FROM THE FEDERAL 
PARTIAL BIRTH ABORTION BAN 
NEAL DEVINS* 
In the pages that follow, I will link congressional debates over 
partial birth abortion legislation to the Rehnquist Court's 1995-
2001 revival of federalism. My claim is simple: The Rehnquist 
Court was able to revive federalism, in part, because there was 
no reason for the Court to fear political retaliation for its 
federalism decisions. Congress, interest groups, and the 
American people do not care about federalism. On abortion-
related issues, pro-choice interests care about the pro-choice 
agenda; pro-life interests care about the pro-life agenda. 
Federalism does not figure into these agendas and, as such, it is 
politically irrelevant to the debate over abortion. The political 
fight over partial birth abortion exemplifies Congress's 
uninterest in federalism. Specifically, there are virtually no 
references to Rehnquist Court commerce clause decisions in the 
debate over partial birth abortion legislation-even though these 
decisions cast doubt on the constitutionality of a federal ban on 
partial birth abortion. 
Before turning to Congress's enactment of partial birth 
abortion legislation, I will provide a brief summary of my larger 
claim, that is, that the Rehnquist Court's revival of federalism is 
tied to the fact that voters, interest groups, and lawmakers 
routinely tradeoff federalism in pursuit of their favored 
• Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and Mary. 
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substantive policy agenda.l Unlike issues such as gun control, 
same sex marriage, and the death penalty, federalism is too 
"abstract and complicated ... to engage the passion of citizens."2 
Consequently, federalism is routinely undervalued in the 
political process; voters, lawmakers, and interest groups, even 
those who understand and value federalism, will nevertheless 
have strong overriding preferences about one or more substantive 
ISSUeS. 
Single issue voters are a classic and extreme example of this 
phenomenon. These voters are willing to subordinate secondary 
preferences (including federalism) in order to secure their first 
order preferences (typically the environment, civil rights, gun 
control, or abortion). Abortion is a classic and extreme example 
of this phenomenon. Pro-choice voters support freedom of clinic 
access legislation and oppose bans on partial birth abortion. It is 
simply irrelevant to pro-choice interests that both bills embrace a 
broad view of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 
For their part, pro-life voters are equally uninterested in 
embracing a consistent view of Congress's commerce clause 
power. They oppose clinic access legislation and support bans on 
partial birth abortion. Likewise, pro-life interests traded off 
federalism values in the Terri Schiavo case. Rather than accept 
state court rulings that Ms.· Schiavo's feeding tube should be 
removed, pro-life interests backed federal legislation remanding 
the case to the federal courts. For pro-life interests, only one 
thing mattered: the culture of life.3 · 
Single issue voters are certainly the exception, not the rule. 
But the willingness of voters, interest groups, and lawmakers to 
manipulate federalism in order to secure preferred substantive 
policies is the rule. Self-interested voters and interest groups are 
able to "move freely from one level of government to another in 
an attempt to find the level at which they might try most 
1 The balance of this paragraph and much of the next four paragraphs are drawn 
from Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 131, 132-37 
(2004). 
2 John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Symposium: The Rehnquist Court: Federalism us. 
States' Rights: A Defense of Judicial Reuiew in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 89, 96 
(2004). 
3 See Charles Fried, Federalism has a Right to Life, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005, 
at A17 (explaining how Terry Schiavo legislation ignored federalism values); see also Neal 
Devins, Tom DeLay: Popular Constitutionalist, 81 CHI-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) 
(giving a detailed treatment of congressional consideration of the Terri Schiavo bill). 
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advantageously to get what they want."4 Elected officials 
understand this-invoking federalism when it comports with their 
substantive policy agenda but otherwise ignoring the federal-
state balance. 
The historical record makes clear that all players in the 
American political process are "willing to contemplate the 
exercise of power by either level of government, depending upon 
which level can more persuasively demonstrate that it can do the 
better job."5 Consider, for example, the Reagan administration. 
On the one hand, the administration strongly backed federalism-
issuing an executive order on federalism, pushing for state 
control of federal grants, and asking the Supreme Court to return 
power to states on abortion, school desegregation, and prayer.6 
Despite this commitment to federalism, the administration was 
willing to intervene at the state and local level to advance its own 
agenda. In order to protect powerful business interest groups, 
the administration sometimes backed away from its federalism 
executive order.7 On social issues, the administration intervened 
in the Baby Doe8 case, arguing that federal standards ought to 
govern medical decisions involving infants born with severe 
handicaps.9 
From the Supreme Court's perspective, the lesson here is 
simple: Unless judicial interpretations foreclose the pursuit of 
first order policy priorities, it is unlikely that elected officials, 
interest groups, or voters will formally and consistently embrace 
any theory of federalism. More to the point: The Court need not 
4 E.E. SCHATISCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 10-11 (1960). 
5 James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: 
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L. J. 1003, 1010 (2003). See 
Devins, supra note 1, at 134-35 (providing further examples of this practice). 
6 See NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 68-69, 134-35, 
202-04 (2004) (discussing the Reagan administration's backing of federalism). 
7 See DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE 
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 143-49 (1992) (demonstrating how the Reagan administration was 
willing to circumvent federalism at times in order to advance its own agenda). 
8 Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986). 
9 The George W. Bush administration has similarly abandoned its ostensible 
commitment to states' rights in order to pursue its social policy agenda. Among other 
things, the administration sought to limit Oregon's physician assisted suicide law and 
California's medical marijuana initiative. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Explore U.S. 
Authority Ouer States on Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at A5. The Bush 
White House has also pushed for national standards on same-sex marriage and partial 
birth abortion. See Carl Hulse, Senate Rebuffs Same-Sex Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, June 
8, 2006, at A20; see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Expand Review of 'Partial-Birth' 
Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2006, at Al4. 
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fear a political backlash by embracing one or another theory of 
federalism (or inconsistently pursuing a theory of federalism).10 
*** 
Against this backdrop, Congress's consideration of partial birth 
abortion legislation is especially instructive. Even though the 
bill's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause was anything 
but clear, lawmakers, interest groups, and the American people 
ignored the bill's federalism implications. As I will soon explain, 
there was no incentive for bill proponents or opponents to discuss 
possible federalism objections to the bill. Consequently, 
lawmakers never discussed federalism-making the fight over 
partial birth abortion a fight over first order policy preferences 
(freedom of choice vs. sanctity of life). 
To start, a few words about why the partial birth abortion ban 
implicates the federal-state balance: When Congress first 
debated the partial birth abortion ban (in 1995), the Rehnquist 
Court had just decided United States v. Lopez,ll a decision 
reinvigorating judicial limits on Congress's commerce power. 
When enacting the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 
(PBABA),12 Congress acted in the shadow of United States v 
Morrison,13 a 2000 Supreme Court decision strengthening Lopez. 
Lopez and Morrison spoke of the need for Congress to regulate 
economic activity which substantially affects interstate 
commerce. Under this standard, the constitutionality of the 
PBABA is debatable.I4 First, there is reason to question whether 
10 For reasons that the author and others have detailed, the Court must make sure 
that its decisions are acceptable to the American people and their elected officials. See 
Devins & Fisher, supra note 6; see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH (2006); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). 
11 514 u.s. 549 (1995). 
12 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (2006). 
13 529 U.S. 598 (2000). In 2005, the Rehnquist Court embraced a broader view of 
Congress' commerce power in Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). And while Raich 
certainly strengthens the commerce clause foundations of the PBABA, it is irrelevant to 
the author's analysis. The author's concern is Congress' interest in federalism when 
enacting the PBABA. At that time, the relevant cases were Lopez and Morrison. 
14 For a further analysis of the constitutionality of PBABA see David P. Kopel & 
Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously: Lopez and the Partial Birth Abortion 
Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59 (1997); Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The 
Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367 (2002); 
Allan Ides, The Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003 and the Commerce Clause, 20 CONST. 
COMMENT. 441 (2004); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. , Does Congress Have the Constitutional 
Power to Prohibit Partial-Birth Abortion?, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319 (2005). 
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the regulation of a medical procedure is in fact, economic 
regulation. Just as gun possession and domestic violence are not 
commercial activities (notwithstanding their impact on the 
economy), the absolute prohibition of one type of abortion 
(irrespective of whether there is a monetary exchange) is 
arguably a statement about morality that does not implicate any 
commercial activity. Second, even if such abortions constitute 
commerce, it may be that this infrequently used procedure _does 
not "substantially'' impact commerce. After all, "a few million 
dollars is a drop in the ocean of our national economy."15 
This is not to say that the PBABA cannot be reconciled with 
Lopez and Morrison. A strong case can be made that the PBABA 
comports with Rehnquist Court federalism decisions.16 
Nevertheless, the federalism issue is hardly a throw-away. In 
1995, three law professor witnesses flagged this issue in 
congressional hearings on the PBABA.17 Starting in 1997, law 
15 Pushaw, supra note 14, at 336 (characterizing how an opponent of the PBABA 
would argue that Congress lacks commerce clause authority to enact the bill). 
16 For an explanation of how PBABA can be reconciled with other of the Rehnquist 
Court's decisions see Pushaw, supra note 14, at 326. Indeed, federalism played no part in 
lower court rulings on the PBABA In fact, all lower court rulings have invalidated the 
PBABA as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's 2000 invalidation of a state ban on 
partial-birth abortions. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006); 
Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. 
v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006). On Feb. 21, 2006, the Supreme Court agreed 
to review the Carhart decision. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006). The 
Commerce Clause issue was not raised in filings before the Court and there is no reason 
to think that the Justices will tackle this question. Likewise, in deciding (on June 19, 
2006) to review the Planned Parenthood v. Gonzales decision, the Justices gave no 
indication that they would be considering federalism issues. See Gonzales v. Planned 
Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006). On Nov. 8, 2006, the Supreme 
Court heard oral arguments in the PBABA cases. Federalism played next to no role in the 
oral arguments; it was not raised in the Carhart oral arguments and received just two 
brief mentions in the Planned Parenthood Fed'n oral arguments. The first and most 
significant mention occurred when Justice Ginsburg noted that the PBABA was the first 
instance of Congress regulating abortion procedures and asked Solicitor General Paul 
Clement "[h]ow should that weigh in this case?" Clement's response was telling; he 
remarked that federalism should not figure into the Court's decisions "principally because 
the other side in neither case makes a challenge based on the Commerce Clause." 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20, Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006) (No. 05-1382). The 
second mention was a question by Justice Stevens about whether the Commerce Clause 
would support application of the PBABA to "free clinics." Solicitor General Clement noted 
that the government did not take a definitive position on this question because the 
federalism issue had not been raised by plaintiffs in their challenge to the PBABA and, 
consequently, the issue had not been briefed. Id. at 21-22. 
17 For a discussion of this issue in the context of the 1995 Congressional hearings see 
Partial-Birth Abortion: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House 
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reviews started publishing articles questioning Congress's 
commerce clause power to enact the PBABA.18 The Washington 
Post, The National Review, and the Legal Times also published 
opinion pieces raising federalism objections to the PBABA.19 
But when Congress enacted the PBABA in 2003, these 
federalism issues received no meaningful attention. 1% out of 
214 pages of congressional debate raised the federalism issue.20 
And while 40 Senators and 98 House members commented on the 
PBABA, only two legislators (Senator Diane Feinstein (D-Calif.) 
and Representative Ron Paul (R-Tx.)) spoke about federalism.21 
More than that, Feinstein was the only lawmaker to suggest that 
the bill was inconsistent with Rehnquist Court federalism 
decisions. For its part, the House Judiciary Committee did 
tackle the federalism issue in its report (although the report 
makes no mention of the amount of money flowing nationwide 
from partial-birth abortions).22 At the same time, Committee 
members did not engage each other on this question. Outside of 
a passing reference to the commerce clause issue by one law 
professor witness, committee hearings did not consider 
federalism issues at all.23 Likewise, the fourteen House Judiciary 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 101-02 (1995) (statement of David M. Smolin, 
Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University). For the statements of 
Louis Michael Seidman, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center and 
Douglas W. Kmiec, Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Notre Dame, see The 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1833 Before the S _ Comm_ on the 
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 189, 193, 202-04 (1995). 
18 For examples of law reviews that published articles questioning whether Congress 
had the power to enact PBABA see Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 14; La·v, supra note 14; 
Ides, supra note 14; Pushaw, supra note 14. 
19 See Simon Lazarus, Next on Abortion: Supreme Collision, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 
2003, at B4 (raising objections to the PBABA); see also Jonathan H. Adler, One Bad Turn 
Doesn't Merit Another, NAT'L. REV. ONLINE, Jul. 2, 2002, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-adler070202.asp (questioning the 
PBABA and the ways in which it offends federalism); Alan B. Morrison, Can This be 
Legal? Another Bill on Partial-Birth Abortions, Another Bout of Constitutional Questions, 
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at 52 (questioning constitutionality of PBABA). 
20 See Memo from Joshua McKinley to Prof. Devins, Federalism in the Congressional 
Record on the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, June 1, 2006 (copy on file with the author). 
21 To view the statements of the two legislators who commented on the PBABA and 
federalism, see 149 CONG. REC. S12914, 12938 (daily ed_ June 4, 2003) for the statement 
of Senator Feinstein, and see 149 CONG. REC. H4934, H4935 (daily ed. June 4, 2003) for 
the statement of Representative Ron Paul. 
22 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-58, at 23-26 (2003). 
23 See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 760 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H_ Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 18 (2003) (citing statement of Gerard V_ Bradley, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame). 
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Committee members wh0 attached their "dissenting views" to the 
Committee Report made no mention of the Commerce Clause.24 
Congress's earlier consideration of the PBABA (in 1995 and 
1997) also gave short shrift to federalism.25 In 1995, federalism 
barely registered in congressional debates. Even though the 
Supreme Court had just decided Lopez,26 less than 3 pages (out of 
roughly 687 pages) of congressional debate touched on 
federalism-related issues. More than that, much of what 
lawmakers had to say about federalism had nothing to do with 
the constitutionality of the PBABA; the focus, instead, was about 
the propriety of Congress intruding on state healthcare 
prerogatives.27 Likewise, the House Committee Report on the 
1995 PBABA never addressed the commerce clause issue; the 
only mention of federalism is a reference (by those who voted 
against the bill) to partial birth abortion being "properly a state 
criminal and civil issue."28 
States' rights arguments were virtually nonexistent in the 
debates and hearings surrounding the 1997 version of the Act. 
Only one lawmaker raised federalism in 158 pages of 
congressional debates and that lawmaker (Senator Diane 
Feinstein) did not speak about the bill's constitutionality under 
the commerce clause. Instead, Feinstein spoke generally about 
24 For a copy of the dissenting views to the committee report see H.R. REP. No. 108-
58, at 147-54 (2003). 
25 See Katharine Q. Seelye, Veto Sustained on Bill to Ban Some Abortions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1998, at A1 (explaining that President Bill Clinton vetoed partial birth 
abortion legislation in 1995 and 1997 and that efforts to override his vetoes failed) . 
26 514 u.s. 549. 
27 These arguments were made by both Democrats and Republicans, including 
Republican opponents on the legislation. See 141 Cong. Rec. S16730 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 
1995) (statement of Mr. Dole). 
28 For a copy of the dissenting views to the PBABA, including the argument that 
partial birth abortion is a state and not a federal issue see H.R. REP. No. 104-267, at 23 (1995). To their credit, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees did receive testimony 
about the Commerce Clause from three law professor witnesses and one Senator. See 
Partial-Birth Abortion: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 101-02 (1995). At that hearing, the Committee 
received the statement of David M. Smolin, Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, 
Samford University. See The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 
1833 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 189, 193, 202-04 (1995) for the 
statement of Louis Michael Seidman, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center, and the statement of Douglas W. Kmiec, Professor of Constitutional Law, 
University of Notre Dame; and the statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Comm. 
on the Judiciary. 
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states' rights issues.29 There was only one mention of federalism 
in the 170 pages of published hearing testimony.30 
*** 
Federalism did not figure into the debate over partial birth 
abortion because neither pro-choice nor right-to-life interests had 
any incentive to talk about such mundane issues as whether 
abortion regulations are "economic" and whether the aggregate 
impact of partial birth abortions "substantially affects interstate 
commerce." Pro-choice lawmakers and their constituents (who 
had previously backed a broad view of congressional power when 
pushing for freedom of access to abortion clinic legislation) cared 
about abortion rights, not the federal-state balance. They saw 
the debate as a moral and legal debate about the right to choose, 
especially efforts by right-to-life interests to chip away at Roe31 
through the PBABA. Pro-choice lawmakers, in other words, 
spoke to their base by speaking about abortion rights. Indeed, 
because close to 70% of Americans backed the ban on partial 
birth abortions,32 lawmakers who voted against the ban had 
strong pro-choice leanings. For these lawmakers, the right to 
choose was especially important to their constituents. By 
opposing the PBABA, these lawmakers sent a message that 
resonated with their base.33 
In 2003, moreover, pro-choice interests understood that their 
legal position was strengthened by the Supreme Court's 2000 
invalidation of Nebraska's partial birth abortion ban in Stenberg 
v. Carhart.34 Perhaps for this reason, pro-choice lawmakers 
thought that the courts would likely strike down the federal law 
29 For the statement of Sen. Feinstein in regards to states' rights issues, see 144 
CONG. REC. S10551, 10560 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1998). This statement was made in 
connection to congressional efforts to override President Clinton's veto of the 1997 bill. 
30 See Partial-Birth Abortion: Joint Hearing on S. and H.R. 929 Before the House 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Senate 
Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. 140 (1997) (including the statement of Louis Michael 
Seidman, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center). 
31 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973). 
32 See CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, Oct. 24-26, 
2003,http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm 
(indicating that close to 70% of Americans supported the ban on partial birth abortions). 
33 See Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining Why Senate Democrats 
Can Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making but Not the Rehnquist Court, 73 U. Colo. 
L. Rev. 1307, 1328-29 (2002) (discussing message politics and position taking legislation). 
34 530 u.s. 914 (2000). 
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and, as such, they could speak to their base about those issues 
that truly mattered to them. In 1995 and 1997, pro-choice 
lawmakers-knowing that President Clinton would veto the bill-
also thought they could speak to their base about first order 
policy preferences. 
For right to life lawmakers, the federalism issue was likewise 
irrelevant. These lawmakers had previously backed a broad view 
of congressional power when supporting legislation limiting the 
transport of minors across state lines to have an abortion and 
legislation making it a crime to harm an unborn child when 
committing a violent crime against the mother.35 The thought of 
opposing the PBABA because it threatened the federal-state 
balance was a non-starter for these lawmakers. Their 
constituents were intensely interested in right-to-life issues, not 
federalism. Moreover, since pro-choice interests were not 
attacking the bill on commerce clause grounds, there was no need 
to start a conversation about an issue that was irrelevant to their 
base.36 And with the Supreme Court's Carhart37 decision casting 
its shadow on the 2003 debates, right-to-life lawmakers focused 
their legalistic energies on distinguishing the federal PP ABA 
from the Nebraska statute invalidated in Carhart.38 
The dearth of discussion about the Commerce Clause or states' 
rights issues in the legislative hearings, reports and debates over 
partial birth abortion is to be expected. Interest groups, the 
American people, and lawmakers care about first order policy 
priorities. Sometimes that means supporting measures that 
embrace a broad view of congressional power; sometimes that 
means opposing such measures. As such, there is nothing to be 
gained and much to be lost by taking federalism seriously and 
35 See Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act, H.R. 748, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(limiting the transport of minors across state lines for the purpose of obtaining an 
abortion); see also Child Custody Protection Act, H.R. 1755, 108th Cong. (2003) (making it 
illegal to transport minors across state lines for the purpose of obtaining an abortion and 
thereby allowing the minor to obtain an abortion without parental notification in states 
that require such notification); Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 118 Stat. 568 (2004) 
(protecting the rights of unborn children in the face of violent crimes). 
36 The fact that lawmakers could have strengthened their handiwork by making 
specific findings about the economic impact of the PBABA did not matter to right to life 
lawmakers. See Pushaw, supra note 14, at 336. Instead, reflecting Congress's general 
uninterest in constitutional questions, lawmakers focused their energies on symbolic 
statements that mattered most to their constituents. See Devins, supra note 33, at 1328-
29. 
37 530 u.s. 914. 
38 Id. 
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calling upon the courts and Congress to police the federal-state 
balance. Mter all, neither pro-life nor pro-choice interests want 
their views of the federal-state balance to cabin their ability to 
support legislation that backs up their favored policies. 
It therefore comes as no surprise that the national political 
process will not police federalism-based limits on Congress's 
powers. Likewise, because federalism is a low salience issue, the 
courts have substantial leeway to reinvigorate f~deralism. 
Unless Court federalism decisions significantly limit the 
dominant political coalition's first order policy priorities, there 
will be no federalism constituency pushing elected officials to 
retaliate against a too aggressive Court.39 Consider, for example, 
the PBABA. Were the Court to invalidate the statute on 
commerce clause grounds,40 pro-life interests would turn their 
attention to other "culture of life" issues. Rather than pursue a 
reconfiguration of Court federalism decision making (most of 
which has nothing to do with abortion), these interests would 
pursue other measures restricting abortion and, more generally, 
embrace states' rights on abortion-related decision making. For 
their part, pro-choice interests will not embrace limitations on 
Congress's Commerce Clause power- even if the Court were to 
invalidate the PBABA on Commerce Clause grounds. 41 In 
particular, pro-choice interests recognize that they too would pay 
a price if the Court were to narrow Congress's powers-for pro-
choice interests sometimes push for laws that embrace a broad 
view of Congress's powers under either the Commerce Clause or 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
39 For more detailed discussion, see Devins, supra note 33, at 1320-23. 
40 For reasons detailed above, it seems unlikely that the Commerce Clause issue will 
be considered by the Supreme Court in its review of the PBABA. This is because the most 
pressing issues raised by the PBABA do not surround the Commerce Clause. Instead they 
center on a person's views towards abortion in general. For a discussion on PBABA and 
the Commerce Clause see Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 14; Law, supra note 14, Ides, 
supra note 14, Pushaw, supra note 14. See also supra text accompanying note 16, 
remarking that federalism played no meaningful role at oral arguments in PBABA cases. 
41 In opposing the Supreme Court review of a lower Court decision invalidating the 
PBABA, pro-choice interests never referred to the Commerce Clause implications of the 
PBABA. See Respondents' Brief in Opposition, 
http://www.crlp.org/pdf/Op_Cert_Carhart_Final.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2006). The brief 
argues that the Supreme Court addressed the issue at hand five years ago when it struck 
down a similar statute banning partial birth abortions in Stenberg v. Carhart. See The 
Federal Abortion Ban: Headed to the Supreme Court, http://www.crlp.org/crt_pba.html 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2006). 
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It is time to wrap up: The Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 
2003 exemplifies the irrelevance of federalism to the American 
political process. Even though this piece of legislation was 
extremely controversial, lawmakers, interest groups, and the 
American people ignored federalism based objections to the 
law.42 The PBABA is also instructive in understanding the 
Rehnquist Court's 1995-2002 revival of federalism. Not only 
were lawmakers unlikely to police federalism in any meaningful 
way, there was little reason for the Court to fear that its revival 
of federalism would prompt a political backlash. Interest groups 
care about their substantive agenda, an agenda which sometimes 
supports and other times opposes a broad view of national power. 
The PBABA is a classic example of this phenomenon: There was 
absolutely no reason for pro-choice or pro-life interests to think 
that a narrow or expansive approach to federalism would 
meaningfully assist them. As such, there was no reason to resist 
or embrace Court rulings on federalism-based limits to 
congressional power. 
42 The same can be said of journalists. Outside of a handful of opinion pieces, no news 
story about the PBABA in the New York Times, Washington Post, L.A. Times, and the 
Wall Street Journal discussed the federalism implications of the law. See generally 
McKinley, supra note 20. 
